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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LAV AR C. FOX,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
11336

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent is in substantial agreement with Appellant's statement of the case.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Summary Judgment was granted in favor of
Plaintiff and against the Defendant in the sum of $2,230.00 plus costs.

ACTION SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Judgment
of the Trial Court.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent purchased an in-board-out-board,
seventeen foot glasspar boat and motor in or about
March, 1965 for .$2,000.00 cash (R-6). Subsequently,
on or about the 30th day of April, 1965, Respondent
obtained a policy of insurance coverage on said
boat from the Appellant (R-7), thereafter, on or about
the 2nd day of May, 1965, the boat and motor were
lost while Respondent was boating on Utah Lake
(R-17).
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Appellant refused to make payment to Respondent under the terms of the policy of insurance '
written upon the boa.t and motor of Respondent, although at one time they informed Respondent that
they would do so (R-17).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND BASED ON THE RECORD BEFORE THE
COlJRT.

Respondent does not question the fact that Appellant's Answer put in issue all of the allegations
of the Complain1. However, it is respectfully submitted that Request for Admissions (R-4-10) and the
answers thereto m-11-12), together v,-~+h n-,_ .• AFi:::13·/i
of Respondent (R-17) in connection with the Motion
for Summary Judgment shifted the burden forceful-
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ly to Appellant. This burden could not be, and was
not, in fact, met by the vague, verbose, irrelevant,
inadmissible, and inexact elements of the Affidavit
of Keith Lambourne (R-18-19), submitted in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Paragraphs number 2, 5, 6 and 7 of the Affidavit
of Keith Lambourne all seek to raise issues outside
the pleadings, and which Appellant had waived by
failure to assert those matters by way of affirmative
defense. It is well established that the breach of insurance policy provisions must be raised by affirmative pleading. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Company vs. Koval, CCA 10th, 1944, 146 F2d, ll8.
The cited case holds that a claim for breach of cooperation clause is an affirmative defense and must
be specially pleaded.
Our Rule 8(c) is substantially the same as the
Federal Rule, and is identical as regards the matter
for which it is cited in this case. There are nineteen
of the most commonly invoked defenses listed in the
rule, but it is not limited to those so listed. A substantial review of the Federal Law developed
around Ru]e 8(c) is reported in Barron and Hotlzoff,
Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules Edition, Volume IA, Section 279. J\t page 161 of the cited volume,
was read:
"Other matters which have been held by the
Courts to constitute affirmative defenses which
m'.Jst be specifically pleaded include ... breach of
insurance policy provisions"
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At page 163 of the cited volume, it is reported:
"In an action for a loss covered by an insurance
policy, the burden is on the defendant insurer to
show that the loss was excepted by the terms of the
policy"

and at page 166, Barron and Holtzoff, it says:
"Generally a failure to plead an affirmative
defense results in a waiver of that defense and it
is excluded as an issue in that case".
(citing Allstate Tnsurance Company vs. Moldenhauer, CA7, 1952, 193 and others).

In Carol vs. Paramount Pictures, DC New York,
1963, 3 FRD 47, the Court states:
(Matters) "although discussed in great detail
in these papers submitted to the Court, may not be
considered as they have not been pleaded as affirmative defenses and are therefore not in issue".

Rule 12 of the URCP, provide that with four
stated exceptions, (none of which are relevant here)
a party waives all defenses and objections which he
has not raised by Motion or Answer. At page 370,
Barron and Holtzoff, above cited, it is stated.
"There are no other exceptions or qualifications".

Paragraph number 3 of Affidavit of Keith Lambourne (R-18-19) i8 at best irrelevant. Respond:-..,t c:i::;serted in his Affidavit that the boat and motor insured with the Appellant was lost as stated in Utah
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Lake (R-17). This affirmation was unequivocal, and
in order to present a material issue of fact to go to
Trial, the Appellant was bound by Rule 56(c) to affirmatively state that no boat insured by the Appellant and belonging to the Respondent was lost. The
best this Appellant can come up with is an "I
couldn't find it" plaint. It is not conceivable that under our rules, this can be given effect or taken
seriously.
This leaves paragraph number 4 of the subject
Affidavit for consideration. (Paragraph number 1 is
neither controverted nor significant in the subject
matter of the law suit itself). Respondent's Affidavit
is clear that it was "his boat" (R-17). It is respectfully
submitted that the law does not require the Plaintiff
to satisfy the Defendant on a question of ownership
in a suit such as this. Indeed, from the history of
this case, it is 3uggested that there may well be no
quantum of evidence which would be sufficient to
satisfy this reluctant insurance company. The fact
is that Respondent has unequivocally and without
reservation affirmed under oath that he owned the
boat which was covered by an insurance policy
written by the Appellant, and that the boat was lost.
A mere allegation that no proof of ownership has
been submitted to them is therefore, subject to the
same defect as that urged for paragraph number 3
above.
There is another and equally fatal flaw in the
Affidavit of Keith Lambourne which should be controlling. The Affidavit shows on its face that it is
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based on hearsay. The facts allegedly asserted by
the Affiant relate to action of others and not the Af
fiant. The Affiant does not state that they were performed in his presence nor hat he had any personal
knowledge of those facts. This violates Rule 56(c)
URCP which provide that Affidavits must be made
on personal knowledae of facts which would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that
the Afiiant is competent to testify in the matters
therein stated. In this instance, the Affiant fails to
show affirmatively that he is competent to testify to
a single paragraph in his Affidavit with the exception of the first, and on the contrary, affirmatively
shows that he ls no1 so competent to testify.
In fact, the effect, if not the detail of the sworn
statement of Keith Lambourne (R-18-19) and particularly paragraph number 4 is false, which fact is
known to him in all probability and certainly to
counsel for the Appellant. \/\!hile it is not reflected in
the record, it is a matter of record that Respondent
provided the Appellant with a receipt from his seller
for the boat in question. Counsel has requested return of this receipt for the purpose of this suit, and
although counsel for Appellant has agreed to obtain
and return it, it has not been so returned to this
date. This matter was covered in argument of counsel in the Court below.
All of the issues raised by Appellant's Answer
were clearly and unequivocally met by Resp0r_::ient's Affidavit so that at this point there was no remaining issue. Appellant urges that there is no proof

I
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of damages in the record. However, Respondent has
made a prima fade case which is nowhere controverted by the Appellant. The document attached as
the first Exhibit to Respondent's Request for Admissions shows on its face what the value of the boat
and motor were as of the date of the policy. This
was less than a week before the loss of the insured
property. In addition thereto, the Appellant does
have the receipt hereinabove referred to which
shows the purchase price of the boat. All of this
within approximately one month of the loss of the
boat. Also, Respondent testified under oath as to the
price he had paid for the boat in his Deposition
cited by Appellant. The policy of insurance which
Appellant admits was issued in their Answer to Request for Admissions <R-11-12) provides for no deduction if the prC>perty is a total loss. All of this information is as readily available to the Appellant as
to the Respondent and for this reason was never
put in issue except by way of general denial, and
met by the documents in the record herein referred
to.
With regard to the amount of the Judgment, it is
deemed sufficient to note that the Complaint asked
for interest according to law on the sum of $2,000.00
from a specific date, and under the circumstances
this can scarcely in good faith be urged as a valid
point of error. No objection was interposed by Appellant on this point or on the question of damages
either in the hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment or at the hearing of his Motion to Alter or
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Amend the Judgment, and therefore waived in all
events.
Appellant's effort to raise issues through the Affidavit of Keith Lambourne were abortive as canvassed hereinabove by the numbers. Thus the Judqment was proper and should be sustained.
POINT IT
ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL MADE AT HEARING
ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NO SUB·
STITUTE FOR PROPER PLEADINGS AND CAN NOT
BE USED TO RAISE ISSUES THAT WERE NOT
OTHERWISE PROPER.LY BEFORE THE COURT.

Appellant has incorrectly represented the
argument of counsel at the hearinq on Motion for
Summary Judgment. Certainly, counsel did not
argue that "any defens8s that the defendant had
would have to have be8n raised as an affirmative
defense under Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure". On the contrary, counsel did urge that
THE ISSUES SOUGHT TO BE RAISED BY THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEITH LAMBOURNE OUTSIDE THE
PLEADINGS, were waived because not timely and
correctly presented. The effectiveness of the general denial Answer to put the allegations of Plaintiff
in issue was never questioned.
This brings us to the "Defendant's understanding of the Rules ... ". It is respectfully urged that
such a condition is not and can not be given weight
in the law. Here, as elsewhere in its Brief, Appellant
seeks exoneration and reprieve because of what De-
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fendant "understood". The Trial Court has entered
its Judgment pursuant to the Rules and the law
based on the legal effect of the particular pleadings
and documents before it, and without reference to
the understanding of the effect of those documents
on the part of either parties or counsel. We believe
this is elementary law and manifestly correct.
Russell vs. Hooper Irrigation Company. 20 U2d
173, cited by Appellant is clearly no authority for
the broad proposition for which it was urged. Justice
Henroid emphasized that in THIS (the Hooper) case,
an issue was raised as to a material fact on oral argument. There is nothing in the cited case to indicate
a disposition on the part of this Court to render oral
argument at hearing on a Motion for Summary
Judgment a legally effective substitute for proper
pleading and particularly where the rules have already effected a waiver of the matters so argued. To
so conclude is to render meaningless the clear provisions of Rules 56, 8(c) and 12(h), URCP.

Respondent, while holding that the issues
sought to be raised by Appellant for the first time
in the Affidavit of Keith Lambourne were legally
waived as hereinbefore argued would, nevertheless, be inclined to exercise some element of legal
charity if th matter so put forward came to the
knowledge and attention of Appellant after the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by Respondent. The facts are very clearly otherwise. Counsel
for Appellant advised Respondent's counsel by
telephone of the purported real defenses of the In-
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surance Company the day before the Answer was
received. It was a genuine surprise to see that these
alleged defenses were not affirmativelv stated in the
Answer. In subsequent conversation between counsel after the Motion for Summary Judgment was
filed, Appellant inquired as to the purpose of the
Motion and was pointedly advised that all of the
defenses theretofore discussed had not been pleaded and the Plaintiff was entitled to a Judgment on
the issues which had been raised. Nevertheless, no
Motion for Leave to Flle an Amended Answer was
then made or in fact has been made at all. It is clear,
that failure to plead the affirmative defenses hinted
at and sought to be raised by innuendo in the Affidavit of Lambourne V1.ras intentional and not accidental. The nature of the referenced Affidavit and
whole history of this case shows that the Appellant
is without any information legally sufficient to substantiate such defenses and they are therefore unwilling to affirmatively plead any such defenses.
Appellant has had more than three years in which,
with their unquestionable resources, to develop information to substantiate any real defenses, but they
have failed to do so. Should the Appellant be en·
titled to have it both ways?
POINT III
SUMMARY ,JUDGMENT WAS GRANTED TO
PLAINTIFF IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES
AND THE LAW AND APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
ALTER OR AMEND WAS CORRECTLY DENIED.

Respondent does not arque with the law cited
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generally by Appellant with regard to safeguarding
jury Trial when there is a genuine issue of material
fact. But it is submitted that none of the arguments
of Appellant's Brief are sufficient to overcome the
fact that the pleadings, Request for Admissions and
Deposition, together with the legal effect of the Affidavit show affirmatively that the Plaintiff was entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law, there being
no genuine issue of material fact. The refusal of the
Court to Alter or Amend the Judgment and to vacate
the same as requested by Appellant was, therefore,
proper.
In all events, the Affidavit of the Respondent
{R-17) establishes an undisputed account stated. The
Affiant affirmatively states that the insurance company had agreed to pay the claim and then subsequently refused to do so. This allegation stands undisputed in all the pleadings and the record, and
is sufficient by itself to be controlling in this matter.
Respondent elects not to canvass the many Utah
cases respecting the weight to be accorded the decision in the lower Court, believing that this Court
has a much more conclusive and inclusive grasp
thereof than does the Respondent or his counsel,
since it must be urged by nearly every Respondent
filing a Brief or arguing before the Court.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the pleadings,
Deposition and admissions on file, together with the
Respondent's Affidavit, show that there was no gen-
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uine issue as to any material fact. The Trial Court
correctly granted Judgment to Respondent as a matter of law, and this Judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK A. MADSEN
330 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent

